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Abstract 
A major accomplishment of development finance in recent years has been the 
expansion of the supply of tinancial services for the poor. Little information exists, however, about 
the extent to which micro finance actually reaches the poor. This study analyzed a sample of clients 
served by tive microtinance organizations in Bolivia. The data revealed that these organizations 
reach many rural and urban poor, but not the poorest of the poor. Group-based lenders reach a 
somewhat poorer clientele than those organizations making individual loans. The individual lenders, 
however, seem to be able to better adjust loan sizes to fit the creditworthiness of the client. 
Therefore, individual lenders appear to face fewer constraints in increasing loan sizes in response 
to client demand. The ability of these organizations to adjust to loan demand may be important in 
int1uencing their ability to retain clients as competition among organizations increases. 
POVERTY AND MICROFINANCE IN BOLIVIA' 
Sergio Navajas, Richard L. Meyer, Claudio Gonzalez-Vega, 
Mark Schreiner, and Jorge Rodriguez-Meza~ 
I. Introduction 
A major accomplishment of development finance in recent years has been the expansion of 
the supply of financial services for the poor. A variety of organizations are experimenting with 
di rrerent types of products, lending technologies, and institutional arrangements designed to give 
poor people much greater access to microtinancial services than is available through traditional bank 
and nonbanking institutions. Today in Indonesia and Bangladesh, for example, millions of 
household-enterprises arc reached by these new arrangements, and in other developing countries the 
numbers of clients reach tens of thousands. A recent World Bank ( 1996a) inventory revealed that 
206 institutions had about US$7 billion in outstanding small loans made to more than 13 million 
individuals and groups as of September, 1995. 
Many micro finance institutions claim they reach the poorest of the poor, but little empirical 
evidence is available to demonstrate the poverty level of clients or the extent to which certain 
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programs and methodologies reach a poorer clientele than others.3 Such demonstration is not an easy 
task. Moreover, there is a major gap between the emerging literature on poverty assessments and 
attempts to collect systematic information about access to financial services by various poverty 
groupings. Attempts to close the gap arc ot1en constrained by a lack of data on either the clients or 
the population in areas served by micro finance organizations (e.g., Hulme and Mosley). 
This paper contributes to closing the gap by reporting on a comparative study of five 
microtinance organizations in Bolivia. Bolivia is a particularly interesting developing country to 
study because considerable experimentation in microfinancc is occurring and the total number of 
clients served now exceeds 120,000. One ofthis country's most important microfinance institutions, 
BancoSol, is the first non-governmental organization (NGO) in Latin America to transform itself 
into a formal private commercial bank specifically catering to the poor (Glosser). Several other 
microlimmce organizations exhibit strong outreach and sustainability outcomes (Gonzalez-Vega et 
a!., 1997b). Furthermore, the country's per capita GNP is estimated at only US$ 770 (World Bank, 
1996b) and income distribution is highly skewed so that 86 percent of the rural population is 
estimated to live in poverty (UNDP). 
The present study includes BancoSol and four other organizations recognized for 
innovativeness in serving poor urban and rural clienteles. The next section of this paper brietly 
describes these live organizations and the data collected from their clients. This is followed by a 
discussion of the procedure used to measure client poverty. The following sections report the 
comparative results on clientele distribution by poverty level and the relationship between poverty 
and size of loan received. The last section presents implications of the findings. 
H. Data 
The analysis reported in this paper is part of a larger research project designed to examine 
the evolution of five comparatively successful microtinance programs in Bolivia:1 They are 
BancoSol - a private, fully-chartered commercial bank; Caja de Ahorro y Prestamo Los Andes - a 
private, non-bank regulated financial institution, and three NGOs: Fundaci6n para la Promoci6n y 
Desarrollo de la Microempresa- PROD EM, Centro de Fomento a Iniciativas Econ6micas- FIE, and 
Fundaci6n Sartawi. All five have reached fairly high levels of success measured by international 
standards such as those considered in Christen eta!. All received considerable amounts of technical 
assistance and concessionally priced loans and grants. Some have already achieved and the others 
are gradually approaching subsidy independence. 
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Moreover, not all microfinanee organizations granting loans to poor people are sustainable. 
This highlights the challenge of reaching this clientele in a cost-effective manner. 
Additional information about the project, its objectives, and results can be found in 
Gonzalez-Vega et al. (1997b ). 
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There arc several differences amongst the tivc organizations. BancoSol, PRODEM, and 
Sartawi rely heavily on a group lending technology while FIE and Caja Los Andes usc mostly 
individual lending. Most clients of BancoSol, FIE, and Caja Los Andes arc located in urban areas, 
while PRODEM and Sartawi cater mostly to a rural clientele. The tive organizations share a 
commitment to serve a population largely excluded from commercial bank services. They grant 
l~1irly small first-time loans and increase loan sizes with repeat lmms, charge relatively high interest 
rates, and develop close client relations by even hiring staffwho speak indigenous languages. They 
pursue aggressive collection policies so arrears rates and writc-ofTs arc very small. 
We surveyed a random sample of clients with active loans as of September, 1995. Logistical 
aml cost considerations required that interviews were limited to the urban areas of La Paz and El 
Alto and the rural Altiplano around Lake Titikaka. The total number of clients of these organizations 
in the study areas exceeded 52,000 and this number represented a significant portion of their total 
clients. A total of 622 clients were interviewed and the sampling proportions varied from just under 
1 to over 3 percent of the clients to assure a significant representation from each organization and 
avoid sampling errors. For the present analysis, due to some missing values, 588 observations with 
complete data were included. The distribution was 221 BancoSol clients, 124 for Caja Los Andes, 
9 l !or FIE, 83 for Sartawi, and 69 for PROD EM. 
Two unique features were incorporated into the data collection. First, data were collected 
on some client characteristics that could be compared to poverty information available about the 
Bolivian population. Second, complete borrowing histories for the clients were provided by the lmU1 
officers and corroborated by credit dossiers. The mean number of loans per client ranged from 2.5 
in FIE to just over 5 for BancoSol. These data permit a comparison between the poverty of the 
clients and the general population as well as an analysis of loan sizes relative to client poverty. 
Ill. Poverty Measurement in Bolivia 
Poverty can be measured in a variety of ways and there is a vast literature exploring the 
alternatives and their limitations (e.g., Blackwood and Lynch). The purposes of this study and the 
objectives of many micro finance institutions are to utilize a methodology that provides reasonable 
estimates of client poverty levels using data readily observable or obtainable. Comprehensive 
income and consumption surveys are too costly and time consuming from this perspective. 
The selection of Bolivia for this study was fortuitous because of its nationwide poverty 
assessment in the form of a Mapa de Pobreza (Poverty Map). This assessment was prepared using 
an Unsatisfied Basic Needs (UBN) approach common in Latin America to determine some of the 
physical and nonphysical requirements for a meaningful life. The method consists of: 
(a) defining basic needs and their satisfiers, 
(b) selecting variables and indicators that express degrees of satisfaction, 
(c) defining a minimum level for each indicator below which the need is considered unsatisfied, 
and 
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(d) classifying households as poor when one or more basic needs are unsatisfied (Boltvinik). 
The UBN approach measures poverty directly in terms of characteristics of goods and 
services. Because of the difticulty of defining individual poverty, everyone in a poor household is 
considered to be poor. 
The Mapa de Pobreza employed the standard UBN methodology. Four basic concepts were 
selected as the components of a comprehensive poverty index: (a) housing, (b) access to public 
services, (c) education, and (d) access to health services. The first two reflect the physical 
environment and the quality and availability of public services. The last two retlect two necessary 
conditions for human capital formation in the form of education and access to health services. In 
otht.:r Latin American studies, health is usually not included. 
The following characteristics were then defined for the components: 
I. I lousing: 
(a) Quality of construction materials for floors, walls and roof. 
(b) Availability of' rooms relative to number of occupants. 
2. Public Services: 
(a) Type and origin of water and sewage systems. 
(b) Availability of electricity and fuels used for cooking. 
3. Education: 
(a) Years of school completed. 
(b) Attendance in school now. 
(c) Literacy. 
4. Health: Access to health services (formal or informal). 
A norm or minimum level was defined for each variable. When the norm is not reached, the 
household is considered to have not satisfied that basic need. The methodological problem involves 
defining a sensible norm for each concept. The process required defining minimally acceptable 
levels, then comparing them with Census data. If the modal values in the Census were compatible 
with the proposed norm, then the norm was accepted. Otherwise, the second most frequently 
observed value for the concept in the Census was used as the norm. Except for water, sewage, and 
some building materials, the same norms were used for urban and rural areas. 
Once the norms were established for each component, a ratio was calculated between the 
norm and the observed value. This ratio is defined as the Index of Achievement and is specified as 
follows: 
where lxJ = standardized Index of Achievement. 
xJ =value ofthc variable in householdj. 
x· =value of the norm. 
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The range of this ratio depends on the range of options in the Census. When the observed 
value is equal to the nonn, the Index of Achievement is equal to one. The ratio may be greater than 
two, in which case it is rescaled to a maximum value of two, so the range of variability is kept 
constant. This truncation means that the index is a better proxy of poverty than it is of wealth, 
particularly for higher income households that far exceed the norms. 
For the education variable, a comprehensive index was specified for each person in the 
household as: 
ane = (ap +as /ap-1<+as*)al 
I} I} I} If 
where ane,J =Index of Achievement of education of individual i in household j. 
ap, 1 =years of schooling of individual i in householdj. 
as11 =school attendance of individual i (I if attending, zero otherwise). 
ap,/ = norm for years of schooling by age of individual i. 
as,J * = norm for attendance of individual i. 
al,J = literacy of individual i ( 1 if literate, zero otherwise). 
The norms for years of schooling, literacy, and attendance are determined by the age of the 
individual. A family education index was constructed by averaging the indices for all persons in the 
household. 
The overall poverty Index of Achievement for the household was calculated by simply 
averaging the indices for the four components: 
I = l/4(CV +CSB +RE +CSS) 
J J 1 1 J 
with CV1, CSB1, RE1, CSS1 referring to housing, public services, education, and health, respectively. 
Given the Index of Achievement, an Index of Poverty was constructed as: 
The critical levels of this poverty index are ~ 1 (highest level of basic needs satisfaction), 0 
(household poverty line), and 1 (lowest level ofbasic needs satisfaction). 
Using the Index of Achievement, the Mapa methodology classified households into two 
broad categories: poor and non-poor. In tum, each category was broken down into further sub~ 
categories: 
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(a) The Poor Household category is divided into three subdivisions of"poorest," ''indigent," 
and ''moderately poor." The poorest arc those households that achieved 0 to 30 percent of 
the Index, while the indigent reached 30 to 60 percent of basic needs satisfaction, and the 
moderately poor achieved 60 to 90 percent. 
(b) The Non-Poor Household category has two subdivisions. By definition, a household 
reaching 90 percent of basic needs satisfaction is considered non-poor. "Threshold" house-
holds arc those that on average satisfy 90 to 110 percent of the basic needs, while the 
"satisfied" arc defined as those satisfying 110 percent or more. A heterogeneous aggregate 
of non-poor households beyond the threshold is included in the category of ·'satisfied." 
Not all the Mapa de Pohre::::a questions could be included in our client questionnaire. Those 
that were included represented about 56 percent of those used for the lvfapa. With them we 
constructed an equivalent index for the clients of the micro finance organizations, using the same 
weights for the variables common to the lvfapa. We also divided the sample into the same five 
poverty categories as reportl.!d in the lvfapa. 
IV. Clientele Distribution by Poverty Level 
The results presented in Table l show the incidence of poverty as measured in the Mapa in 
the urban and rural areas of La Paz province, which correspond to the regions from which the clients 
were sampled. The table also shows the distribution of clients of the five micro finance organizations 
by poverty level. 
Table 1. Distribution of Clients by Index of Basic Needs Achievement by Region 
and Organization (percentages). 
NON POOR POOR 
Area/Organization Satisfied Threshold Total Moderate indigent Poorest Total 
La Paz- urban 26.6 17.0 43.6 39.0 16.7 0.7 56.4 
FIE 34.0 45.7 79.8 18.1 2.1 0.0 20.2 
Caja Los Andes 23.4 50.8 74.2 22.7 3.1 0.0 25.8 
Ban coSo! 21.3 42.3 63.6 33.9 2.5 0.0 36.4 
La Paz - rural 0.9 2.3 3.2 21.0 64.0 11.9 96.9 
PROD EM 10.8 8.1 18.9 66.2 14.9 0.0 81.1 
Sartawi 4.7 19.8 24.4 57.0 17.4 1.2 75.6 
Striking features of the data are both the high incidence of poverty in Bolivia and the depth 
of rural poverty compared to urban. About 56 percent of the urban population of La Paz province 
were classified as poor compared to almost 97 percent in rural areas in the same province. 
Furthermore, almost 12 percent of the population in rural areas were in the poorest category 
7 
compared to less that one percent in urban areas. Likewise, 64 percent of the rural population were 
classified as indigent compared to 17 percent of the urban population. Clearly, poverty is pervasive 
and especially deep in rural Bolivia. There is tremendous scope, therefore, for microfinance 
institutions that can develop lending and deposit mobilization methodologies to serve the poor. 
Data in Table I show that Sartawi is the only organization to reach any clients in the poorest 
category, but these borrowers represent only a little more than one percent of its total number of 
clients in the sample. All five organizations reach some clients in the other four categories, but the 
proportion of indigent clients reached is far less than their share of the total population. There is 
relatively little difference among the three urban programs or between the two rural programs in the 
share of clients represented by the two poorest categories. 
If the objective of these organizations is to reach the very poor in their respective market 
areas, it can be concluded that they have not succeeded very well, at least given this method of 
poverty measurement. This paper cannot evaluate, however, if the poorest and the indigent are 
creditworthy. lf they arc not creditworthy, granting them loans would be misguided and counter-
productive and these microfinance organizations arc correct when they do not lend to this segment 
of the population. Other interventions would be more appropriate to lift them out of poverty 
(Gonzalez-Vega, 1994 ). 
Bm1coSol stands out in reaching the category of moderately poor in urban areas: 34 percent 
of its clients belong to this group. This organization is followed by Caja Los Andes, for which 23 
percent of its clients are moderately poor, while PIE ranks third in urban areas, with only 18 percent 
of its clients among the moderately poor. In rural areas, 66 percent of PROD EM and 57 percent of 
Surtawi borrowers are moderately poor. Therefore, by adding the three poor categories as a proxy 
of their depth of outreach, these organizations can be ranked by proportion of their poor clientele as: 
PRODEM (81 percent), Sartawi (76 percent), BancoSol (36 percent), Caja Los Andes (26 percent) 
and FIE (20 percent). The last two are organizations making individual loans, while the first three 
rely on group loans. 
Additional differences among the organizations emerge in the higher wealth categories of 
clients. About a third of FIE clients have satisfied their basic needs fully compared to a quarter for 
Andes or a fifth for BancoSol. The proportions are one in ten clients for PRODEM and one in 
twenty clients for Surtawi. Although these clients have been classified as non-poor according to this 
methodology, it is not possible to determine how wealthy they may be. It is logical to expect, 
however, that few truly wealthy people would be attracted to these five organizations when they have 
access to commercial bank loans with lower interest rates. 
\Vhile the largest portion of the clientele of the rural organizations are moderately poor, the 
greatest share of the clientele of the urban organizations is at the threshold. This share ranges from 
42 percent for BancoSol to 51 percent for Caja Los Andes. There may be some debate about how 
poor are those who have just satisfied minimum basic needs in education, housing, and access to 
public services (the threshold), but clearly the typical clientele of these organizations are neither 
wealthy nor among the poorest of the poor. 
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Compared to FIE (80 percent) and Caja Los Andes (75 percent) with large shares of non-poor 
clients, in BancoSollcss than 64 percent of the clients are non-poor. In turn, BancoSol has a third 
of its clients in the moderately poor group compared to about one fifth for the other two institutions. 
This suggests that BancoSol borrowers belong to a lower tier of the population. a perception 
suggested in our earlier descriptive analysis of the survey data (Gonzalez-Vega eta!., 1996). 
The rural comparison shows that PROD EM has a larger share of satisfied and of moderately 
poor clients than Sartawi but a smaller share or threshold clients. Adding up these categories, only 
about one fifth of PRODEM clients and one fourth of PRODEM clients arc non-poor. Both 
institutions, however, have poor clients that in total arc closer to the proportion of poor in the rural 
population than do any of the urban organizations in comparison to the incidence of urban poverty. 
Two generalizations emerge from these results. First, the rural microlinancc lenders seem 
to have reached a poorer clientele than their urban counterparts. This is an interesting result because 
there is a general belief in the microiinance community that a lending technology of small short-term 
loans with fn.:qul.!nt repayments is not easily replicable in rural environments.~ Part of the cxplana-
tion of this success in terms of depth of outreach may be that many of these rural clients live relative-
ly dose to La Paz and El Alto and, like the urban poor, they arc heavily engaged in trading activities. 
Second, the group lending technology adopted by BancoSol, PRODEM, and Sartawi seems 
to reach a somewhat poorer clientele than either of the two individual lenders. This is not un-
expected because the usc of the collateral substitute of peer pressure and peer monitoring through 
joint-liability solidarity groups allows households without traditional real collateral to gain greater 
access to loans than permitted through individual lenders. The clients, however, must pay higher 
interest rates for the higher average costs of making smaller loans and incur the additional 
transaction costs of group borrowing (Gonzalez-Vega eta!., l997a) 
Figure 1 graphically summarizes these results and depicts the distribution of the Index of 
Achievement by lender. The five categories of poor and non-poor clients are shown in the horizontal 
axis and the percentages of clients represented by each category are plotted on the vertical axis. The 
graphs for the five microfl.nance organizations are presented according to their depth of outreach. 
The distributions of the index for the urban and rural areas of La Paz province are shown for 
comparison. Three tiers of clients are identifiable: (a) FIE and Caja Los Andes, (b) BancoSol, and 
(c) Sartawi and PROD EM. 
This paper does not evaluate the levels of cost incurred, which are higher in rural areas, and 
it does not assess the sustainability of these organizations. It appears, however, that the rural 
organizations are either more subsidy dependent (PRODEM) or less institutionally viable 
(Sartawi) than their urban counterparts. This is not the place to discuss the tradeoffs 
involved (Gonzalez-Vega et al., 1997b). 
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Figure 2 presents a box and whisker plot for the distribution of the Index of Achievement for 
the clients of the five micro finance organizations. The index is measured on the vertical axis. A 
value of 0. 9 is defined as barely meeting basic needs satisfaction. The width of each shadowed box 
reflects the relative number of clients included in the study from each of the respective organizations. 
The height ofthc boxes is equal to the interquartilc distance (TQD), i e., the range of values for the 
index contained within the second and third quartiles of the distnbution. Shorter boxes represent 
a more concentrated distribution. The box for FIE, for example, shows that 50 percent of its clients 
arc heavily concentrated around the values of 0.9 to l.l for the index. This is the threshold group 
and corresponds to the data reported m Table !. The box for Caja Los Andes shows a similar 
concentration, but with a greater proportion of clients closer to the 0.9 level. The longer box for 
BancoSol indicates a less concentrated distribution, with 50 percent of its clients more equally 
distributed between the threshold and moderately poor groups. The boxes for PRODEM and Sartawi 
mdicatc a greater concentration of clients in the moderately poor group. 
The horizontal white line in the interior of each box is located at the median of the data. The 
median Index of Achievement for FIE clients (1.05) is above the 0.9 poverty line hut within the 
threshold group. That is, a typical FIE client is just above 100 percent satisfaction of basic needs. 
rhc median Index of Achievement for clients of Caja Los Andes ( 1.0) is a bit lower. The median 
Index of Achievement for BancoSol clients (0.95) is a hit lower still. The typical clients of all three 
urban organizations arc at the threshold. The medians for Sartawi (0.74) and f(Jr PRODEM (0.72), 
in contrast, define the typical rural client as moderately poor. 
The darker indented portions of the boxes allow for the identification of statistically 
significant differences among the medians. The darker areas partly overlap for FIE and Caja Los 
Andes meaning that their typical client's poverty is not statistically different. The darker area for 
BancoSol, however, is a bit lower signifying that the typical client is poorer. The coincidence of the 
darker areas for PRODEM and Sartawi shows that their typical clients arc identically poor. These 
results identify three tiers fairly distinct in the microfinance market niche: 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
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upper threshold group (FIE and Caja Los Andes), 
lower threshold group (BancoSol), and 
moderately poor group (PRODEM and Sartawi).6 
Gonzalez-Vega et al., (1996) further discuss the features of these three tiers. 
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The whiskers beyond the boxes identify either the extreme values of the data or a distance 
equal to 1.5 times the IQD from the center of the distribution, whichever is less.7 The client 
distributions can be ranked by the ranges defined by these whiskers. The greatest satisfaction of 
basic needs is achieved by some FIE clients, with the upper whisker reaching the highest value of 
the index. Interestingly, BancoSol's upper whisker reaches higher than for the Caja Los Andes' 
distribution. This is also true for PRODEM with respect to Sartawi. 
Similarly, the lower whiskers for FIE and C<Ua Los Andes are located at a higher index value 
than for the BancoSol distribution. That is, the two individual lenders in urban areas arc more 
reluctant to grant loans to poor people or these poor households cannot pledge the guarantees 
required by these organizations. BancoSol's outreach, as shown by its considerably lower whisker, 
stands out. The two rural organizations reach into even deeper povcriy strata, pariicularly in the case 
of Sartawi. 
V. Poverty Level and Loan Sizes 
The data in Tables 2 and 3 report the average size of current and first-time loans granted to 
the clients by poverty category. The current loan was the one outstanding at the time of the 
interview, while the first-time loan was the initial one granted when the client became a borrower 
of the organization. For a new client, the current and first-time loan arc the same. 
Table 2. Average Size of Current Loan by Poverty Groups and Organization (1995 
US Dollars). 
NON POOR POOR 
Organization Satisfied Threshold Total Moderate Indigent Poorest Total 
La Paz- urban 
FIE 1,795 1,082 1,386 837 222 n.a. 772 
Caja Los Andes 1,306 1,389 1,363 382 379 n.a. 381 
Ban coSo I 710 654 673 468 679 n.a. 483 
La Paz- rural 
PRODEM 302 270 288 325 204 n.a. 303 
Sartawi 220 287 274 226 194 252 220 
n.a. =Not applicable. 
FIE stands out among the urban lenders by making loans averaging almost US$ 1,800 for 
clients whose basic needs have been satisfied. This organization then scales the amount back to just 
under US$ 1,100 for threshold clients. Caja Los Andes makes loans of roughly US$ 1,300 for both 
7 In a Gaussian distribution 99.3 percent of the data will fall inside the whiskers. The 
horizontal lines beyond the whiskers represent outliers in the data. 
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satisfied and threshold clients compared to loans of about US$ 700 for BancoSol clients in these 
same two categories. The current loans of FIE were also much larger for moderately poor clients 
(about US$ 850) than for the other two urban lenders (US$ 400-450). The average size of current 
loans made by FIE show a consistent pattern of decreasing loan size as poverty increases. There is 
es!->c.:ntially no difference in the current loans made by Caja Los Andes to its moderately poor and 
indigent clients (about US$ 380), while the current loans made by BancoSol to the indigent are 
essentially as large as those made to the non-poor. Surprisingly, the moderately poor received the 
smallest BancoSolloans.8 
No clear pattern in current loan sizes is observed for the two rural lenders. Loan sizes seem 
to be fairly uniform across the live poverty categories. In the case of Sartawi, in particular, this 
reflects the limitations of its lending technology, which allows for very little screening of individual 
clients. The conclusion suggested by these data is that individual loan sizes arc more closely 
adjusted to poverty levels than are group loans. This is consistent with the observation that lenders 
making individual loans pay more attention to the income and debt repayment capacity of their 
clients than do group lenders. This, in turn, reflects some delegation of screening functions to group 
members. 
The data presented in Table 3 tell a great deal about the organizations' first-loan policies. 
It is common practice among microlinancc organizations to make similarly small first-time loans 
to all clients, and then increase loan size for repeat loans consistent with the clients' repayment 
performance. This practice of uniform initial loans seems to apply for the three group lenders, but 
not for FIE and Caja Los Andes, the individual lenders. That is, there is no consistent pattern in 
first-time loan sizes across poverty categories for BancoSol, PROD EM, and Sartawi. In contrast, 
first-time loans by FIE follow a consistent pattern of larger loans for wealthier clients, as was also 
noted for current loans. The results for Caja Los Andes are mixed but it is also generally true that 
wealthier clients receive larger first loans than poorer borrowers.9 The lenders of individual loans 
apparently engage in more careful loan screening and rationing of loan sizes beginning with the very 
first loan than do the group lenders. The group lenders utilize peer pressure and peer monitoring in 
group formation and in loan size determination coupled with standard policies about first-time loans 
as substitutes for more intensive borrower screening for the determination of loans sizes. 
8 
9 
This result may reflect some outliers or errors in measuring poverty. 
There is a positive but fairly weak correlation between the Index of Achievement and loan 
size. For current loans the Spearman correlation coefficients are: Caja Los Andes (0.40), 
FIE (0.32), Sartawi (0.23), BancoSol (0.14) and PRODEM (0.11). For first time loans, the 
coefficients are: Caja Los Andes (0.48), FIE (0.26), Sartawi (0.22), PRODEM (0.08), and 
BancoSol (-0.04). 
14 
Table 3. Average Size of First Loan by Poverty Groups and Organizations (1995 
US Dollars). 
NON POOR POOR 
Organization Satisfied Threshold Total Moderate Indigent Poorest Total 
L:~ Paz - u rha n 
FIE l, 127 595 822 518 170 !Ul. 481 
Caja Los Andes 367 530 479 127 I 13 n.a. 125 
Ban coSo! 126 125 125 172 121 !1.<1. 168 
La Paz- rural 
PROD EM 145 178 159 178 123 lUI. 168 
Sartawi 142 !53 !51 131 I'" J. 125 131 
11.11. = Not applicable. 
A comparison of the data presented in Tables 2 and 3 provides insights into an issue greatly 
debated among microfinance institutions, namely client graduation to larger loans. Although many 
poor borrowers are unlikely to make such rapid economic progress that they will demand much 
larger loans in the ncar future, some could have successfully borrowed and repaid a larger first-time 
loan than was granted or will be able to service much larger loans in the future. Lenders making 
individual loans claim to have <m advantage in graduating clients to larger loans because they have 
accumulated information about individual borrowers and usc a lending technology compatible with 
estimating debt repayment capacity (Schmidt and Zeitinger, 1996). Group lenders, in contrast, may 
face constraints of two types. First, they do not have an individual loan product to offer their best 
clients who demand larger individual loans to avoid the transaction costs and risks of group lending. 
Second, other members of a borrowing group may not want to be jointly liable for a larger than 
average size loan demanded by one of their group's members even if the lender is prepared to grant 
it. In this situation, group lenders face the loss of their best customers who may switch to individual 
lenders to satisfy their loan demand. 
The loan data reveal that rural borrowers on average face the greatest constraints to 
increasing loan size. Their current loans are roughly twice the size of first-time loans and there is 
little difference in loan size by poverty group. Poor urban borrowers with Caja Los Andes face 
approximately the same situation. Poor and nonpoor BancoSol borrowers increase loan sizes at a 
much faster rate, but because of loan size policies there is relatively little difference across poverty 
groups. It appears to be harder for a particularly successful borrower to get a much larger loan in 
this situation. The nonpoor borrowers in Caja Los Andes, and especially FIE, appear to have the 
best prospects for significant increases in borrowing capacity, provided they can demonstrate the 
creditworthiness that the individual lending methodology requires. These results suggest there is 
some truth to the argument that group lenders face greater constraints than individual lenders in 
increasing loan sizes. This may place them at a competitive disadvantage in retaining wealthier 
clients as microfinance expands and competition increases among microfinance organizations. 
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VI. Implications 
The five Bolivian microfinance organizations included in this study have made significant 
strides in supplying the urban and rural poor with financial services. Many household-enterprises 
considered unbankablc by traditional financial institutions now have access to formal financial 
services, thanks to the innovations of these institutions. These organizations, however, are not 
reaching the poorest of the poor. It is highly debatable if they should. 
There is great enthusiasm in the micro finance community about the positive economic impact 
for the poor of simply receiving a small loan. The verdict is still out on the issue, however, and there 
is a concern about who should bear the high cost of sorting the poor into those who can usc credit 
effectively from those who nL:ed other forms of economic and social assistance. 10 
Furthermore, there is little consensus about the most effective way to deliver sustainable 
financial services to the poor. Should it be through specialized microfinance lenders that only reach 
the poorest, or should it be through organizations such as these five that serve a somewhat broader 
clientele and have the possibility of cross-subsidizing the cost of making smaller loans with income 
earned from larger borrowers? The innovations in lending technology introduced by these 
micro finance organi;r..ations have clearly pushed out the frontier of finance but there arc clear limits 
as to how far down the poverty profile unsubsidizcd institutions can reach and the extent to which 
credit alone can really solve the tough problems i~1ccd by the poorest of the poor. 
10 Hulme and Mosley, for example, argue that there are cases where the poorest clients are 
worse off because of receiving loans. 
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